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Alaska, the Last Frontier of Privacy:




In United States v. Whren, the United States Supreme Court unani-
mously held that if an officer could objectively make a legal traffic stop,
then his subjective intentions were irrelevant.' In so holding the Court
implicitly decided that pretextual traffic stops do not violate the Fourth
Amendment.' A pretextual traffic stop occurs when an officer pulls
someone over for a traffic violation for the purpose of investigating a
separate crime for which the officer did not have probable cause to stop
the vehicle.3 In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the Supreme Court held
that an officer can conduct a search incident to arrest if she has authority
to make a custodial arrest The combined effect of these rulings is that
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004; B.A., Washington Univer-
sity in St. Louis, 1996. I would like to thank Rob Nolan and the staff and board of the Hastings Law
Journal for their work on this Note. I would also like to thank Eric Hedland and Dan Wayne.
t. 517 U.S. 806,813 (i996).
2. Id.
3. Many courts and commentators have defined the meaning of "pretext" and have come up
with different terms. The definition used here is a synthesis of the most common definitions put forth
by the courts and commentators. See United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 518 U.S. IOO7 (1996) (stating pretext occurs when traffic stops are made not for the purpose of
enforcing traffic laws but to search a vehicle); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (Ioth Cir.
1988) (stating pretext occurs when officers use a legal justification to make a stop to search or interro-
gate a person for an unrelated crime); Mings v. State, 884 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Ark. 1994) (stating pretex-
tual arrests are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment); Patricia Leary & Stephanie Rae
Williams, Toward a State Constitutional Check on Police Discretion to Patrol the Fourth Amendment's
Outer Frontier: A Subjective Test for Pretextual Seizures, 69 TEMP. L. REV. ioo7, IOO9 (1996) (stating
pretext is a legal justification for a legally unjustifiable motive for a seizure).
4. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
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officers can follow persons until they violate a traffic law, pull them over,
and conduct a search of the vehicle as a search incident to arrest.
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling that pretextual stops are consti-
tutional, the Alaska Supreme Court on a number of occasions held that
pretextual traffic stops or arrests are illegal in Alaska. These decisions
did not clarify whether the court made its rulings based on Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence or state constitutional grounds. Since Whren
was decided, the Alaskan appellate court has published one case that
dealt with the issue of pretext. A number of unpublished appellate and
district court cases have also raised the issue of pretext.7 Each time the
Alaska appellate court has declined to rule whether pretext stops are still
illegal in Alaska." None of these cases have made a definitive holding as
to the effect of Whren, nor have they clarified what standard the trial
courts should apply to determine if a stop is pretextual.
This Note addresses whether the Alaska State Constitution provides
more protection against pretextual stops than the United States Constitu-
tion. Part I scrutinizes the history of pretext in the courts. It examines the
federal standards for pretext prior to Whren and the line of Alaska pre-
text cases spanning from 1978 to 2002. Part II contends that the Alaska
Constitution provides significantly more privacy protection than the
United States constitution. This Note argues that, on that basis, the
Alaska Supreme Court should reject Whren and find that pretextual
stops are unconstitutional under Article I, Section 22 and Article I, Sec-
tion 14 of the Alaska state constitution.9 Part III proposes that Alaska
should adopt a mixed subjective and modified objective test to determine
if a traffic stop is pretextual. Such a test would first look to the officer's
5. Clark v. State, 574 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Alaska 1978); Brown v. State, 580 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Alaska
1978); McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 138 (Alaska 1971).
6. Hamilton v. State, 59 P.3d 76o, 764-65 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
7. Gonzales v. State, Nos. A-7421, 4273, 2ooo Alas. App. Lexis 132 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 20,
2000); Johnson v. State, Nos. A-7264, 4258, 2000 WL 1124499 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 9, 200o0); Tap-
scott v. Municipality of Anchorage, Nos. A-6821, 4o63, 1999 VVL 396883 (Alaska Ct. App. June i6,
1999); Pham v. State, No. A-6431, 1997 WL 732654 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 26, 8997).
8. See supra note 7.
9. Article I, Section 14 of Alaska's Constitution provides:
Searches and Seizures. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and
other property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Article I, Section 22 of Alaska's Constitution provides (in part): "The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed."
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subjective intent, and then examine what a reasonable officer would have
done in that situation. °
I. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORY OF PRETEXT IN THE COURTS
A. THE OBJECTIVE VERSUS MODIFIED OBJECTIVE TEST AND THE PRETEXT
DEBATE PRIOR TO WHREN
The U.S. Supreme Court first mentioned pretext in United States v.
Lefkowitz." In Lefkowitz, the police had a valid warrant to arrest Le-
fkowitz for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act.'2 The po-
lice entered Lefkowitz' office, arrested him, and then proceeded to
search the entire office. 3 Lefkowitz argued that the warrantless search
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 4 The police claimed that it was a
valid search incident to an arrest. 5 The Court held that, although the of-
ficers had a valid arrest warrant, they did not have the authority to do an
exploratory search for evidence. The Court stated that "[a]n arrest may
not be used as a pretext to search for evidence."' 6
Almost thirty years later, in United States v. Abel the Court again
touched on the issue of pretext.'7 In Abel, the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (INS) issued a deportation warrant for Abel." The INS
agents arrested Abel, and in a search incident to the arrest, the INS
found evidence of espionage." Abel moved to suppress the evidence
claiming that the arrest was a pretext to search for evidence of espio-
nage.20 The Supreme Court held that Abel's rights would have been vio-
lated if the INS's sole purpose in making the arrest was to search for
evidence of espionage.' The Court held, however, that the evidence in
the record did not support this contention.
Until Whren, the Court did not give any direct guidance to the lower
courts as to what constitutes a pretextual stop or arrest. As a result,
to. See State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 843 (Wash. 1999) (rejecting Whren and holding that courts
should consider both the subjective intent of the officer as well as the objective reasonableness of the
officer's actions under a totality of the circumstances approach).
II. 285 U.S. 452,467 (1932).
12. Id. at 457.
13. Id. at 459-60.
14. Id. at 457.
15. Id. at 462.
16. Id. at 467.
17. 362 U.S. 217, 225 (i96o).
18. Id. at 222.
59. Id. at 218.
20. Id. at 225-26.
21. Id. at 226.
22. Id. at 230.
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lower courts looked to three cases from the late 197OS and early I98OS to
guide their decisions: Scott v. United States, 23 United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez,24 and Maryland v. Macon.5 Interestingly, none of these cases
dealt directly with pretext. Rather, they examined whether an officer's
subjective intent should be taken into account. In all three cases, the
Court held that the subjective intent of the officer was not an issue and
that courts must examine the objective facts. 6
When the pretext issue came before the lower courts, the majority of
the circuits held that because the subjective intent of an officer was
deemed irrelevant in other areas, the courts needed to adopt an objective
test. 7 Following this logic, nine circuits and the D.C. Circuit all adopted a
"could have" test when examining pretext: If the officer could have le-
gally made the traffic stop, then it was not pretextual. 8 Meanwhile, the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits adopted a modified objective test: asking
whether a reasonable officer would have made the stop without the im-
proper motive."
B. THE HISTORY OF PRETEXT IN ALASKA
The Alaska Supreme Court first addressed the issue of pretext in
McCoy v. State."' The court held that for a search incident to arrest to be
valid, three conditions must be met: (I) the arrest must be valid; (2) the
search must be roughly contemporaneous with the arrest; and (3) the ar-
rest must not be a pretext for the search." The Alaska court based its
holding on federal courts' interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.
The court did not do a subsequent analysis of the Alaska constitution.
The rationale that the arrest must not be a pretext for the search came
from Lefkowitz and Taglavore v. United States, where the Ninth Circuit
23. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
24. 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
25. 472 U.S. 463 (I985).
26. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 137 (holding courts should make an objective assessment of an officer's
actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to the officer); Villamonte-Marquez, 462
U.S. at 584 (rejecting the idea that because customs officials came aboard the ship with a state police-
man they could no longer solely rely on the statute that allowed customs officials to board ships with
no reasonable suspicion); Maryland. 472 U.S. at 470 (holding that whether a Fourth Amendment vio-
lation occurs depends on the objective facts, not on the officer's state of mind).
27. See Leary & Williams, supra note 3, at 1013.
28. Anthony J. Weiler, Note, Criminal Procedure -Searches and Seizures: As Long as There Is
Probable Cause to Make a Traffic Stop, Pretextual Arrests Are Constitutional, 73 N.D. L. REV. 373, 378
(1997).
29. United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 475 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d
704, 708 (I Ith Cir. 1986).
30. 491 P.2d 127, 138 (Alaska 1971).
31. ld.
32. Id. at 131.
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wrote, "the search must be incident to the arrest, and not vice versa."33
The McCoy court noted that Alaska must start its analysis with the Fed-
eral Constitution, the Supreme Court, and Ninth Circuit holdings be-
cause these were binding on the state.34 In McCoy, the Alaska court did
not have to beyond the Fourth Amendment because at the time pretex-
tual arrests and searches were considered to be a violation of the United
States Constitution under the Ninth Circuit's Fourth Amendment case
law.
In 1978, the Alaska Supreme Court revisited the pretext issue. In
Clark v. State, the court reaffirmed its conclusion that an arrest should
not be used as a pretext for a search.35 In Brown v. State, the court held
that pretextual traffic stops violate the Constitution, stating: "[I]t is true
that an arrest (or traffic stop) should not be used as a pretext for a
search." 6 In Brown, an officer was responding to an armed robbery call
when he saw a vehicle in the vicinity of the robbery with the headlights
bouncing erratically. According to the officer, this indicated that the ve-
hicle was being driven at an unsafe speed. 7 The officer observed the ve-
hicle make a left turn without signaling or stopping at a stop sign."' He
followed the vehicle for another block. During this time, he received a
physical description of the robbery suspect over the radio.39 The officer
pulled over the car.4' The driver got out of his car and the officer realized
he matched the description and arrested him.4
The driver argued that the traffic stop was illegal because it was a
pretext to seek evidence of the robbery.4' The court, while affirming that
pretextual stops are illegal, found that there was "substantial evidence to
support the trial courts determination that Brown's vehicle was stopped
for a violation of traffic regulations, and that this was not a pretext
stop."43 While upholding the trial court's decision that the stop was not
pretextual, the Alaska Supreme Court did not take the opportunity to
33. Id. at 138 (quoting Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1961)).
34. Id. at 131.
35. 574 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Alaska 1978).
36. 580 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Alaska 1978).
37. Id. at 1175.
38. Id at 1175-76. It turned out that there actually was no stop sign. The court, however, found
that there was no indication that the officer was lying and that it was reasonable for him to think that
there was a stop sign at that intersection under the circumstances.
39. Id. at' 175.
40. Id.
41. Id.




decide what information the trial courts should use to determine whether
a stop is pretextual.44
Ten years later, the Alaska Court of Appeals addressed the pretext
issue in Townsel v. State.45 In Townsel, an officer received a dispatch that
an armed robbery had taken place at the intersection of Old Seward and
Dimond Boulevards. The suspect was a juvenile black male, armed with
a rifle, fleeing on foot.,6 Two minutes after receiving the dispatch, the of-
ficer arrived at the intersection of New Seward and Thirty-sixth Ave-
nue. 7 The officer observed a car going north on New Seward with the
following infractions: one headlight was out; the driver's window was ob-
structed; a taillight was broken allowing white light to shine through; and
the license plate was obscured. 4' The officer turned onto New Seward
and realized that the car was going ten miles per hour over the speed
limit.49 He pulled the car over and saw a shotgun in the back seat." When
the driver went for the gun, the officer drew his weapon and in the ensu-
ing melee the driver escaped on foot.5' He was later arrested and charged
with robbery based on the evidence found in the car.52
In Townsel, the defendant argued that the traffic stop was a pretext
to investigate the robbery.3 The court of appeals upheld the trial court's
decision that the stop was not pretextual. 4 The court of appeals looked
to Brown as the controlling opinion.55 Under Brown the court must de-
termine whether "there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's
determination that [the defendant's] vehicle was stopped for a violation
of traffic regulations and that [the stop] was not a pretext stop.' ' ,6 If the
stop meets these requirements, it is not considered pretextual.
Relying upon the reasoning in Brown, the court of appeals affirmed
the defendant's conviction. The court primarily relied upon the officer's
testimony, which the trial court had found credible." At trial, the officer
testified that he made the stop because of vehicular and traffic infrac-
44. Id.











56. Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 580 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Alaska 1978)).
57. Id.
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tions, not because he was investigating a robbery." The officer also testi-
fied that he would have made the traffic stop even if he had not been in-
vestigating the robbery. 9 The court applied a mixed subjective and
objective test looking to both the officer's subjective intent when he ac-
tually pulled the driver over and what he would have done if he was not
also investigating a robbery.
In 2002, the court of appeals once again faced the issue of pretext in
Hamilton v. State.6° In Hamilton, a murder was reported at 2:32 a.m. in
Fairbanks just off Old Steese Highway.6' A state trooper immediately left
a Safeway where he was conducting a DWI investigation and headed to
the scene of the crime.6' After the trooper turned north onto Old Steese
Highway, he saw two vehicles coming toward him, a snow grader and a
sedan.63 In fact, these were the only two non-police vehicles he had seen
since he left the Safeway.64 The trooper wanted to take down the license
plate number of the sedan to contact the driver later for any useful in-
formation about the homicide. 6' However, the trooper was unable to see
the license plate number so he radioed back to his fellow officers who
were further behind him and asked them to record the license plate
number.6
A fellow officer saw the sedan pass and turned to follow it
southbound along Old Steese Highwayi 7 The officer tried to record the
license plate number but it was obscured by snow.6 She radioed her su-
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 59 P.3d 760, 764-65 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). Between 1988 and 2002 there were a number of
unpublished opinions regarding pretextual traffic stops. These opinions did not use a consistent test to
determine if a stop was pretextual. See Gonzales v. State, Nos. A-7421, 4273, 2ooo Alas. App. Lexis
132 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2000) (using the modified objective test the court held that a reasonable
law enforcement officer would have pulled Gonzalez over under the same circumstances, therefore the
stop was not a pretext); Johnson v. State, Nos. A-7264, 4258, 2000 WL 1124499 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug.
9, 2000) (using the objective test, the court held that the police had probable cause to arrest Johnson,
therefore the arrest was not a pretext); Tapscott v. Municipality of Anchorage, Nos. A-682I, 4063,
i999 WL 396883 (Alaska Ct. App. June 16, 1999) (holding that the stop was legal because the police
had probable cause to pull the car over and Tapscott failed to present any evidence as to the officer
having an improper motive or what the stop was a pretext for); Pham v. State, No. A-6431, 1997 WL
732654 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 26, 1997) (using the objective test, the court held that the officer had an
objective reason to stop the vehicle and that the officer's subjective intentions were irrelevant).
61. Hamilton, 59 P.3d at 762.





67. Id. at 763-64.
68. Id. at 764.
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pervisor who told her to wait for backup and then pull the driver over.
69
Upon pulling the car over, she observed that the driver's hands were
covered in blood. She ordered him out of the car and arrested him.7'
The driver contended that the stop violated the Constitution because
the license plate was a pretext to pull him over to investigate the mur-
der.' The state argued that the stop was not pretextual for two reasons:
(i) the basis for determining if a traffic stop is legal is an objective test;
and (2) it was a proper investigative stop.72 In dicta, the court of appeals
suggested that an objective test should be used to determine the legiti-
macy of a traffic stop.73 The court cited the Alaska Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Beauvois v. State, which held that the legality of an investigative
stop is based on an objective test of whether the facts known to the offi-
cer established a legitimate basis for the stop.74 The court of appeals also
noted that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the "pretext" doctrine in
United States v. Whren.75 The opinion went on to note that Hamilton sug-
gested that the court should reject Whren as a matter of state constitu-
tional law.76 The court of appeals concluded, however, that it did not
need to reach this question because the stop constituted a legitimate in-
vestigatory stop.
77
Under current case law, Alaska Supreme Court cases suggest that
officers' subjective intentions are a valid method to determine whether a
stop is pretextual. Despite this suggestion, the lower courts remain di-
vided. Some judges apply a "reasonable officer" standard and while have
suggested that the standard should be a purely objective one as in Whren.
II. ALASKA'S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE:
A RESPECT FOR PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT TO BE
FREE FROM GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE
A. BACKGROUND ON ALASKA STATE CONSTITUTION JURISPRUDENCE
Early settlers of Alaska often moved north not just to seek a better





73. Id. at 764-65.




78. Susan Orlansky & Jeffrey M. Feldman, Justice Rabinowitz and Personal Freedom: Evolving a
Constitutional Framework, 15 ALASKA L. REV. I, 2 (1998).
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Many moved to Alaska because they found the cities and communities in
the lower forty-eight states too restrictive and conformist for their val-
ues.79 It is partly from this early tradition of personal freedom and pri-
vacy that Alaska's culture and laws have been molded. Alaska became a
state in 1959. Since its inception, it has had an enduring and firm com-
mitment to respecting privacy and the right to be left alone.8 Early opin-
ions from the Alaska judiciary tended to use federal case law to interpret
similar provisions of the Alaska Constitution.8 ' However, it did not take
long for the Alaska Supreme Court to stake out its own territory. In
1969, the Alaska Supreme Court declared its independence, stating "we
are not bound in expounding the Alaska Constitution's Declaration of
Rights by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, past or fu-
ture, which expound identical or closely similar provisions of the United
States Constitution. ' Two years later the court reaffirmed the impor-
tance of an independent state constitutional analysis, saying, "it would be
an abdication of our constitutional responsibilities to look only to the
Supreme Court for guidance.
8
1
In 1972, Alaska voters passed a constitutional amendment guaran-
teeing a right to privacy' That same year, the Alaska Supreme Court in-
terpreted the new provision for the first time in Ravin v. State.85 In Ravin,
the court found that outlawing the personal use of marijuana inside one's
home violated the state constitution's right of privacy.86 After finding that
ingesting marijuana was not a fundamental right, instead of reverting to
mere rational basis review, the Alaska Supreme Court wrote, "[i]f gov-
ernmental restrictions interfere with the individual's right to privacy, we
will require that the relationship between means and ends be not merely
reasonable but close and substantial." ' The court concluded the state did
not have a substantial interest in invading the privacy of a person's home
because the state's evidence concerning the harms of marijuana to the
user was inconclusive.s
Since 1972, the Alaska Supreme Court has held that the Alaska




82. Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340,342 (Alaska i969).
83. State v. Browder, 486 P.2d 925,936-37 (Alaska i97i).
84. "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed." ALASKA CONST.
art. I, § 22.
85- 537 P.2d 494, 496 (Alaska 1975).
86. Id. at 513.
87. Id. at 498.
88. Id. at 511.
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States Constitution on a wide range of issues.89 In addition, the right of
privacy has been read in conjunction with other provisions of the Alaska
Constitution to create broader state constitutional rights than those that
currently exist under federal law.' For example, the Alaska Supreme
Court has held that "Alaska's search and seizure clause is stronger than
the federal protection because Article I, Section 14 is textually broader
than the Fourth Amendment, and the clause draws added strength from
Alaska's express guarantee of privacy.""9 It is within the Alaska Supreme
Court's purview to hold that the Alaska Constitution affords greater pro-
tection against pretextual traffic stops than the U.S. Constitution.
B. ALASKA STATE CONSTITUTION SEARCH AND SEIZURE JURISPRUDENCE
Having determined that the Alaska Supreme Court has the power to
read its constitutional provisions more broadly than the United States
Constitution, we must next determine whether and in what circumstances
the court should constitutionally prohibit pretextual stops. This section
will first cover a range of search and seizure issues where Alaska has in-
terpreted its provisions more broadly than the United States Constitu-
tion. It will focus on how the Alaska provisions have been applied to
traffic stops. The Alaska Supreme Court has placed a higher value on the
right of citizens to be free from government interference than the United
States Supreme Court. In the types of searches where the United States
Supreme Court has consistently found a diminished expectation of pri-
vacy and justified warrantless searches, the Alaska Supreme Court has
held that the Alaska Constitution affords citizens a greater protection to
be free from government intrusion. It is entirely consistent for the Alaska
Supreme Court to hold that pretextual traffic stops are unconstitutional
and to examine the subjective intent of the officer as a means to deter-
mine if the stop was pretextual.
89. See Anchorage Police Dep't Employees Ass'n v. Anchorage, 24 P.3d 547, 550 (Alaska 2001)
("Since the citizens of Alaska, with their strong emphasis on individual liberty, enacted an amendment
to the Alaska Constitution expressly providing for a right to privacy not found in the United States
Constitution, it can only be concluded that the right is broader in scope than that of the Federal Con-
stitution."); State v. Malkin, 722 P.2d 943, 948 (Alaska 1986) (holding that when a criminal defendant
challenges a warrant as being based on false statements then the government bears the burden of
showing that the false statements were not made recklessly or intentionally-this standard is more
protective than the federal standard.); Glass v. State, 583 P.2d 872, 875-76 (Alaska 1978) (holding that
Alaska can construe its right of privacy greater than the federal right of privacy, and that a warrant is
required for monitoring conversations); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 513 (Alaska 1975) (holding that
Alaska right of privacy covered smoking marijuana inside one's own home).
9o. Anchorage Police Dep't Employees Ass'n, 24 P.3d at 550.
91. Id.
[Vol. 55: 1309
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i. Search and Seizure in Alaska
The Alaska Constitution grants people greater privacy in their cars
than the U.S. Constitution. In 197 9 , the Alaska Supreme Court in State v.
Daniel held that a warrantless inventory search of closed containers or
packages within a vehicle violated the Alaska constitution." After arrest-
ing the driver for drunk driving, a tow truck was called to remove the ve-
hicle.93 Pursuant to regulations, an officer proceeded to take an inventory
of the car.94 While cataloguing the contents of the car, the officer opened
a briefcase that was in the back seat. 95 Inside he found a bag of mari-
juana, a bag of cocaine and a handgun.9 The court granted review of this
case because it had not previously addressed the scope of police inven-
tory searches under Alaska's constitutional guarantee against unreason-
able searches and seizures.'
In analyzing this issue, the Alaska Supreme Court looked to both
federal and state cases as persuasive authority but ultimately rested its
decision on its reading of the Alaska Constitution.0 The court seemingly
rejected the reasoning in South Dakota v. Opperman, where the United
States Supreme Court held that the inventory search of a closed glove
compartment was not unreasonable." In doing so, the court cited exten-
sively from Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion, that took issue with the
distinction the majority made between homes and cars." The court con-
cluded that an automobile is not a talisman that causes the Fourth
Amendment and its protections to disappear.''
Eight years later, the United States Supreme Court examined an
identical issue, in Colorado v. Bertine.'°2 The Court came to a very differ-
ent conclusion than the Alaska court. The Court held that the search of a
closed container was a valid inventory search and not unreasonable un-
der the Fourth Amendment. 3 In addition, the Court ruled that Opper-
man was the controlling case and found that there is a lesser expectation
of privacy in a car, sufficient to justify an inventory search of a closed
container. 4 In contrast, the Alaska Supreme Court previously held that
92. 589 P.2d 408, 417 (Alaska 1979).




97. Id. at 411.
98. Id. at 417.
99. 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976).
ioo. State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d 408,413 (Alaska 1979).
IoI. Id. at 416 (citation omitted).
102. 479 U.S. 367,369 (1987).




people had a reasonable expectation of privacy in closed containers
whether locked or unlocked in a car."5 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that the purpose of the inventory search could be fulfilled by merely writ-
ing down that the car contained a briefcase."" Thus, the Alaska Constitu-
tion affords people greater privacy and protection against government
intrusions when they are in their cars than the U.S. Constitution.
In addition, the Alaska Constitution grants people a greater expecta-
tion of privacy in their person than the United States Constitution. In
two cases, involving searches of a person after an arrest, the Alaska Su-
preme Court rejected the notion that a person loses her expectation of
privacy after being arrested."7 In the late 1970s, the court found in both a
search incident to arrest and a pre-incarceration inventory search that
the Alaska constitution did not permit the police to open containers that
they found on the person.'" The court rejected the notion expressed by
the U.S. Supreme Court that people retain no significant Fourth
Amendment rights in the privacy of their person once they have been ar-
rested."° The Alaska Supreme Court held firm that a search without a
warrant is presumptively invalid unless it met one of a few narrowly de-
fined exceptions."'
2. Traffic Stops and Investigatory Stops in Alaska
Alaska's state law identifies two different types of vehicular stops:
traffic stops and investigatory stops."' A valid traffic stop occurs where
there is substantial evidence to support the determination that the vehi-
cle was stopped for a traffic violation and not as a pretext for a search."2
A legal investigatory stop occurs when there "reasonable suspicion that
imminent public danger exists or serious harm to persons or property has
recently occurred."'"3 In 1990, the court extended the investigatory stop
principle to allow police to stop potential witnesses even when they have
no reason to believe that the person was involved in the crime."4 The
105. Daniel, 589 P.2d at 416.
in6. Id. at 410.
107. Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 734 (Alaska 1979) (holding an arrested person maintains an
expectation of privacy for items carried on him or her that Alaska is prepared to recognize even in a
pre-incarceration inventory search); Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189, i99 (Alaska 1977) (holding ar-
rested people maintain an expectation of privacy for items carried on them that Alaska is prepared to
recognize in a search incident to an arrest).
io8. See cases cited supra note 107.
1o9. Reeves, 599 P.2d at 734.
i I. Id. at 735.
iIi. See Brown v. State, 580 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Alaska 1978); Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 43
(Alaska 1976).
112. Brown. 580 P.2d at 1176.
113. Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46.
114. Metzker v. State, 797 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Alaska Ct. App. 199o).
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Alaska investigatory stop doctrine was established before Terry v. Ohio"5
and was justified under the Alaska Constitution. ,
6
Having dual reasons, with different standards, available to justify a
stop makes it even more imperative that Alaska retains its pre-existing
law outlawing pretextual traffic stops as violative of the state constitu-
tion. The investigatory stop doctrine rightly allows police the authority to
pull people over when they have a reasonable suspicion that an imminent
public danger exists or serious harm to a person or property has recently
occurred."7 Furthermore, it allows the police to stop cars to look for wit-
nesses if a serious crime has recently occurred in the area."'
In Beauvois v. State, the Court of Appeals of Alaska upheld the trial
court's decision that the investigatory stop of a car was legal even though
there was nothing linking the car to the crime."'9 In Beauvois, the defen-
dant robbed a convenience store clerk at knifepoint at approximately
3:00 a.m. ' After the robbery, he ran out of the store and headed north
back toward the campground where his friends were waiting for him.'2 '
The clerk, meanwhile, called the police, gave a description of the perpe-
trator, and stated that he was headed north on foot.'22 Within one minute
of the call, an officer was heading down the only road to the camp-
ground.' 3 Seeing no vehicles or pedestrians, the officer assumed that the
culprit must have been heading on foot to a vehicle in the campground.' 4
He decided to go to the campground and stop any moving vehicle, as-
suming that anyone awake at 3:oo a.m. might have seen something.' 5 The
officer stopped a Corvette that was leaving the campground. , 6 The dis-
patcher informed the officer that the car was stolen and he subsequently
found out that the driver was reported as a missing person.'27 During this
process, he noticed someone hiding under a blanket in the back seat. 1
8
115. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (defining the scope of permissible investigatory stops under the U.S. Consti-
tution).
II6. Coleman, 553 P.2d at 44.
117. Id. at46.
118. Metzker, 797 P.2d at 1221.
119. 83 7 P.2d i 118,1121 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).











He removed the blanket and realized the person fit the description of the
robber of the 7-Eleven.'29 The officer arrested the individual.'3 °
On appeal, Beauvois challenged the investigatory stop because there
was nothing to link the car or its visible occupants to the robbery.'3 ' At
the evidentiary hearing, the officer testified that his intent in stopping the
Corvette was to see if anyone inside the car matched the description of
the robber.'32 The court held that the officer's subjective intent was ir-
relevant to this case. The court noted that the appropriate test was
whether, under the facts known to the officer at the time, the stop of the
car was objectively justifiable.'33 The court further held that the officer
was justified in stopping the car because a serious felony had occurred in
the vicinity of the campground, the robber had fled toward the camp-
ground, and the streets leading to the campground were deserted.'34
Based on these facts, an investigatory stop of the vehicle was objectively
reasonable to determine if the occupants were either involved in the
crime or could provide the police with any useful information.'35
In Hamilton v. State, the Alaska court of appeals implied that the le-
gality of the traffic stop hinges on the objective facts known to the offi-
cers at the time of the stop.' 36 The court, in dicta, stated that the rule
announced in Beauvois should govern traffic stops as well as investiga-
tory stops.'37 The court recognized that this was all that was required to
be acceptable under the Fourth Amendment and United States v.
Whren." However, the court stated that it did not have to decide
whether or not this test satisfied the Alaska state constitution because it
was able to uphold the search on the ground that it was a valid investiga-
tory stop.'39
The court's dicta in Hamilton that the Beauvois test applies to traffic
stops runs counter to all previous Alaska decisions that recognize the il-
legality of pretextual traffic stops. Furthermore, the court in Hamilton
did not give weight to either the differences in the tests or the purposes
behind a traffic stop compared to an investigatory stop. As the court in




132. Id. at 1122 n.I.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1121.
135. Id.
136. 59 P.3d 760, 764 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
137. Id. at 765.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 767.
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whether "a prompt investigation [was] required ... as a matter of practi-
cal necessity.' 40 This exigency that requires a prompt investigation cou-
pled with the requirement that "imminent public danger exists or [that]
serious harm has recently occurred" place strict limits on when an inves-
tigative stop can occur.'
4'
An objective test is satisfactory for investigatory stops because the
situational requirements place strict limits on an officer's ability to legally
pull a person over. Furthermore, because it is legal for an officer to make
an investigatory stop if the person is a witness or a suspect, the officer's
subjective intent is irrelevant. Moreover, it does not infringe any further
on an Alaskan's right of privacy or the right to be free from search or
seizures if the courts ignore the subjective intent of the officer because it
is legal to pull someone over to see if she is a possible witness. The key
requirement for an investigatory stop is that a serious crime must have
recently occurred or that the officer has a reasonable suspicion that im-
minent public danger exists. It also must be a situation where a prompt
investigation is required by necessity. In investigatory stop cases there
can be an evidentiary hearing into the facts surrounding the stop to de-
cide whether or not the facts meet the criteria to be a valid stop.
In suggesting that an objective test or an after-the-fact justification
was appropriate for a traffic stop, the Hamilton court did not even con-
sider the preexisting state law, the differences in purpose between a traf-
fic stop and an investigatory stop, and that changing the traffic stop
doctrine would be an end-run around the investigatory stop doctrine.
The purpose of a traffic stop is not to investigate other crimes, but rather
to enforce the traffic regulations for the safety of the public. Using a traf-
fic stop to investigate other crimes perverts the underlying purpose of the
traffic stop.
If the Alaska Supreme Court adopts the reasoning of the appellate
court in Beauvois, it would render the limits on the investigatory stop
doctrine useless and provide Alaska's citizens with no more privacy pro-
tection than afforded by the United States Constitution. Under preexist-
ing state law, an officer cannot use a traffic stop as a pretext to
investigate another crime and can only use the investigatory stop doc-
trine in limited circumstances. If the pretext doctrine is abandoned, offi-
cers will simply follow a car until the driver violates a traffic regulation.
The petitioners in Whren argued "the use of automobiles is so heavily
and minutely regulated that total compliance with traffic and safety rules
is nearly impossible, a police officer will almost invariably be able to
140. Id. (citation omitted).
141. Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 43 (Alaska 1976).
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catch any given motorist in a technical violation.' ' .2 Thus, the limitations
on investigatory stops would be meaningless. Instead of being restricted
by the limitations on investigatory stops, officers will use traffic viola-
tions as a pretext to investigate other crimes.
This could lead to increased antagonism between law enforcement
and certain communities or people. For example, the petitioners in
Whren argued that this would allow officers to stop people based on
race."'43 This same misuse of the traffic laws could occur in Alaska. In ad-
dition, since Alaska contains so many small towns where the officers
know the local cars and who drives them-it would make legal the selec-
tive harassment of certain individuals that a particular officer might arbi-
trarily choose.'"
The Court in Whren never addressed the unique nature of traffic
regulations; rather it stated that their prior Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence invalidates any attempt to use subjective intent of the officer in
deciding reasonableness.'45 The Court never addressed the key issue of
how allowing pretextual stops affects a citizen's right to privacy and right
to be left alone by the government. This is a central value in the Alaska
Constitution. Therefore, any attempt to change the pre-existing Alaska
law must address how the change will affect the privacy of Alaskan citi-
zens.
It would be inconsistent with Alaskan privacy and search and seizure
jurisprudence to find that the Alaska constitution provides no more pri-
vacy than the U.S. Constitution in the area of pretextual stops. Not only
does Alaska afford people a greater expectation of privacy in their vehi-
cles than required by the U.S. Constitution, Alaska also provides ar-
rested people with greater rights against searches and seizures than
required by the U.S. Constitution. To allow an officer virtually unlimited
discretion to pull a car over to investigate for crimes would provide a
loophole around the greater degree of privacy protected by the Alaska
142. 517 U.S. 8o6, 8so (1996).
143. Id.
144. A full discussion of the problems and harms that arise with the acceptance of pretextual traf-
fic stops is outside the scope of this note. Numerous articles have examined law enforcement's use of
racial profiling, pretextual traffic stops and the problems such practices cause. See, e.g., Abraham
Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Pretext Stops and Racial Profiling After Whren v. United States:
The New York and New Jersey Responses Compared, 63 ALB. L. REV. 725 (2000); David A. Harris,
"Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic
Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (Winter 1997); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, the
Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268 (1999); Wesley MacNeil Oliver,
With an Evil Eye and Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling, 87
TuL. L. REV. 1409 (2000).
145. 517 U.S. at 813.
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Constitution. The Alaska Constitution should afford some protection
from random stops that are pretexts for ill-conceived motives. Thus,
Alaska should retain its preexisting law requiring that a valid traffic stop
cannot be a pretext to search for evidence of another crime.
III. ALASKA SHOULD ADOPT A TwO-PART TEST TO
DETERMINE WHETHER A STOP IS PRETEXTUAL
The Alaska Supreme Court should create a two-part test to deter-
mine if a stop is pretextual. First, courts should examine the subjective
intent of the officer. Second, if the subjective intent of the officer is un-
clear, the court should turn to a modified objective test to see if a rea-
sonable officer would have made a traffic stop in that circumstance. '46
An examination of an officer's subjective intent is an imperative
component for any test for pretext. In examining an officer's subjective
intent, the courts should first address the officer's stated reasons for the
stop. If the officer admits that he was not stopping the car because it vio-
lated a traffic regulation but for alternative reasons the courts should
find that the stop is pretextual. If, however, the officer states that his in-
tent was to pull the car over for a traffic violation, the courts should then
look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop to decide
the officer's subjective intent. They should take into consideration what-
ever extrinsic evidence is available to shed light on the officer's true in-
tent. For example, courts should examine the officer's prior relationship
or encounters with the defendant, what the officer said to the defendant
at the time of the stop, or whether the officer pulling the car over for an
investigatory stop had a reasonable basis to justify his actions.'47 Courts
should then compare the officer's testimony against the other extrinsic
evidence of his intent.
There is no Alaska precedent that precludes an examination of the
officer's subjective intent. In Brown, the court concluded that the traffic
stop was legal because there was substantial evidence to support the trial
court's determination that the officer pulled the defendant over for vio-
lating a traffic regulation."" It is unclear from the court's opinion whether
the trial court inquired into the officer's subjective intent. The officer tes-
146. See Leary & Williams, supra note 3, at 1038-39 (proposing a two-part test for pretextual stops:
"i) Did the officer have a motive for seizing the defendant that was unrelated to the objective exis-
tence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause? 2) Absent that unrelated motive, would the officer
have seized the defendant?"). See also State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 843 (Wash. 1999) (rejecting
Whren and holding that courts should consider both the subjective intent of the officer as well as the
objective reasonableness of the officer's actions under a totality of the circumstances approach).
147. See Leary & Williams, supra note 3, at io38-39 (describing a totality of the circumstances
standard and a similar two-part test).
148. 580 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Alaska 1978).
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tified that after watching the car pass at excessive speed, and turn left
without signaling or stopping at the stop sign, he decided to make a traf-
fic stop.'49 The court looked at the evidence of the blatant traffic viola-
tions and decided that the officer was justified in making a traffic stop.
No pretext appeared to be involved. It is possible that the court did in-
quire into the subjective intent of the officer. It is also possible that they
did not. Nevertheless, it is clear that the decision in Brown did not fore-
close the possibility that Alaska courts could inquire into the subjective
intent of the officer to determine if a traffic stop is pretextual.
Furthermore, in at least one case the Alaska court of appeals has
used an officer's subjective intent as a basis for evaluating pretext. In
Townsel the Alaska Court of Appeals looked to both the officer's subjec-
tive intent and whether or not a reasonable officer would make the stop,
when it determined whether or not the stop was pretextual.5" The officer
testified that he stopped the car because it violated a traffic regulation
not because he was investigating a robbery.'' In addition, he testified
that even if there had not been a robbery he would have still pulled over
a car making those violations.'52 Thus, the officer testified to his subjec-
tive intent at the time and also to what a reasonable officer would do.
Courts and commentators have criticized the subjective test by not-
ing that an officer can simply lie and claim his subjective intent was to
make a traffic stop.'53 However, as Justice Scalia noted in Whren, it seems
odd to make a test for pretext that "cannot take into account actual and
admitted pretext."'54 Furthermore, as Professors Leary and Williams have
stated and as the Washington Supreme Court has noted, "Pretext is, by
definition, a false reason used to disguise a real motive. Thus, what is
needed is a test that tests real motives. Motives are, by definition, subjec-
tive."'55 Therefore, it makes sense to look at the officer's testimony and
subjective intent.
Nevertheless, even after looking at all the evidence, the subjective
intent of the officer at the time of the stop may not be clear. Therefore,
when the first prong of the test is inconclusive the court should use the
"reasonable officer" standard that the Ninth Circuit adopted prior to
Whren."6 Again the court should examine the totality of the circum-
149. Id. at 1175.
15o. Townsel v. State, 763 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (0oth Cir. 1988); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Per-
spectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 436-37 (1974).
154. 517 U.S. 8o6, 814 (1996).
155. Leary & Williams, supra note 3, at 1038; State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833,843 n.I 1 (Wash. 1999).
156. United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 475 (9th Cir. 1994).
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stances to decide whether a reasonable officer would have made the traf-
fic stop. Having an objective test follow the subjective inquiry protects
Alaskan citizens from police deception by basing the decision on more
than the credibility of the officer. A two-part test such as this will provide
the protection necessary to allow Alaskans to maintain their right of pri-
vacy and to continue Alaska's tradition of respecting an individuals right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
CONCLUSION
Alaska has a long tradition of respecting privacy and the right to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion. The Alaska Supreme
Court has consistently interpreted its constitution to provide more pro-
tections from government searches and seizures then the United States
Constitution. Based on Article I, Section 22 and Article I, Section 14 of
the Alaska Constitution, the Alaska Supreme Court should reject Whren.
Further, the Alaska Supreme Court should establish a test to guide the
lower courts when determining if a traffic stop was pretextual. The court
should adopt a test that considers both the subjective intent of the officer
making the stop as well as whether a reasonable officer would have made
the traffic stop. This test provides the greatest protection for Alaskan
citizens by protecting them from traffic stops that violate their right of
privacy and right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
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